The existence of adaptive host manipulation by parasites has received increasing empirical support in recent years. Here I develop an optimality model of the extent of host manipulation, incorporating within-host group size, relatedness and a range of realistic cost^bene¢t functions. The model highlights the cooperative nature of host manipulation, and the potential for cheating this entails. When relatedness in parasite groups is minimal, manipulation is suppressed, but not eradicated, re£ecting the importance of interhost selection. A distinctive threshold phenomenon is predicted for a wide range of parameter values. Below the group size threshold, manipulation is zero. Above the threshold, the predicted behaviour depends critically on the biological details of the individual^group interaction.
INTRODUCTION
The term`host manipulation' is commonly used in the restricted context of macroparasites within intermediate hosts (e.g. Poulin 1998 ; table 1). Here I wish to widen the scope of the manipulation concept to include all hostp arasite systems where the parasite adaptively brings about physiological, morphological or behavioural changes in the host to promote parasite ¢tness, either through an increase in transmission rate and/or persistence time. Table 1 summarizes, with examples, the scope of the manipulation concept used in this paper.
Contributing to host manipulation will in many cases bear a cost to the individual, while the bene¢ts will be felt by every conspeci¢c parasite within the host. If manipulation is costly, a key question emerges: how are costcutting cheats, or`free riders', selected against ?
Parasites have highly clustered spatial distributions, delimited by the bodies of their hosts. As a result, the ¢tness of an individual parasite is frequently related to the behaviour of its neighbours. The interrelated nature of ¢tness is a common theme in models of social evolution, and can be described by expressing ¢tness as the product of an individual and a group component (Frank 1998) .
Analytical studies of social evolution in parasites have until now focused on the evolution of virulence (Frank (1996) provides a thorough review). Virulence (parasiteinduced damage to the host) is a good biological example of a`tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968) , where individual gains lead to group losses. The gain to an individual parasite from higher virulence might be greater transmission to new hosts, while the group loss might be increased host mortality. The details of the models di¡er, but inevitably they describe virulence as a compromise between individual-and group-mediated e¡ects on parasite ¢tness.
In this paper I present, to my knowledge, the ¢rst mathematical model of the evolution of host manipulation using a related approach to the virulence models outlined above. The key di¡erence is that in the manipulation models the individual ¢tness component becomes a declining function of individual e¡ort (re£ecting the costs to the individual of host manipulation), while the group ¢tness component typically becomes an increasing function of total manipulation, re£ecting the bene¢t of manipulation to the parasite group. Rather than a tragedy of the commons, the logic parallels the economic puzzle of collective action (Olson 1965) . Human societies tend to ensure cooperative contributions to society through the use of social enforcement (e.g. taxation, peer pressure). For groups of parasites within hosts, the model suggests that`collective action' is favoured by selection between groups, with groups containing more altruists outcompeting groups of free riders in the battle to infect new hosts. Furthermore, the model makes a novel prediction concerning the existence of a group size threshold, below which manipulative e¡ort is constrained to zero.
In the next section I construct a ¢tness function for host-manipulating parasites, illustrating the basic tradeo¡, modulated by relatedness, between individual and group interest in locally interacting populations. Then I investigate the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of host manipulation using a standard game-theoretic procedure, given di¡ering functions relating individual action to group success. Finally, in } 3, I relate the model ¢ndings to potential empirical test-cases, focusing on comparative predictions of host manipulation by macroparasites, and experimental predictions of cooperative behaviour by quorum-sensing bacteria.
THE MODEL
(a) Cost to individuals, bene¢t to the group Fitness functions in interacting groups can be usefully separated into two elements: individual ¢tness and group ¢tness (e.g. virulence, Frank 1996; vigilance, McNamara & Houston 1992; sibling competition, Godfray & Parker 1992) . In the case of parasitic host manipulationöor any other cooperative ventureöcooperation has a negative ¢tness impact on the individual, and a positive ¢tness impact on the group (and hence, indirectly, on every individual within the group). The approach taken below is to construct a ¢tness function, W, consisting of an individual (I) and a group (G) component in a multiplicative form.
Here m is the individual contribution to host manipulation (scaled between 0 and 1), and W(m 1 ,m 2 ) is the ¢tness of an m 1 strategist in a group of m 2 strategists. I(m 1 ) equals the individual ¢tness function, a declining function of m 1 , and G(n m) equals the group ¢tness function, typically a rising function of summed host manipulation, n m. Starting from a simple case of linear G and I functions, we have
Here c represents the cost to manipulation, and p represents passive ¢tness, the ¢tness of a non-manipulating parasite in a group of non-manipulators. An ESS m (m * ) can be found by maximizing W(m 1 , m 2 ) with respect to m 1 , then setting m 1 m 2 m * , and solving for m * (Maynard Smith 1982) . This technique ¢nds a value of m * such that any slightly deviating m has lower ¢tness. Applying this approach to equation (2) yields
Here d m=dm is the rate of change of mean genotype contribution to host manipulation within the parasite infrapopulation relative to the individual genotype. The slope of group genotype on individual genotype is equivalent to the coe¤cient of relatedness between an individual and its group; thus we can express the equilibrium level of manipulation for di¡ering levels of relatedness by replacing d m/dm 1 with R, the coe¤cient of relatedness to the group (Taylor & Frank 1996) , yielding m * (nR7 cp)/ [cn(1 + R)]. Note that R can be expressed as a function of group size n, and the between-pair coe¤cient of relatedness, r, as follows:
(b) Nonlinear group ¢tness Under the ¢tness equation (2), it is assumed that as total group manipulative e¡ort (n m) increases, group ¢tness increases at the same rate. The simple linear function does not allow group ¢tness to saturate with increasing group cooperation, leading to an impossible in¢nite group-optimum manipulation level. In reality, the relationship between group e¡ort and group ¢tness is unlikely to be linear: upper and lower thresholds are likely to exist. The exact nature of the function G(n m) will depend on the biology of the group interaction under study. First I consider a decelerating function of n m, based on Poulin's (1994a) sketch of a realistic group ¢tness function,
The parameters p and s control the behaviour of G(n m) between 0 and 1. Passive ¢tness, p, describes the lower group ¢tness threshold, received when summed manipulative e¡ort is zero; s controls the sensitivity to increasing summed manipulation. The function is sketched in ¢gure 1.
Substituting equation (5) (5)) is represented by the solid line. The sigmoidal function (equation (7)) is represented by the dotted line. Passive ¢tness, p, sets the level of ¢tness received for zero group manipulation. Saturation rate, s, sets the level of n m required for group ¢tness to reach its maximum. 
A solution for m * was found numerically from equation (6), and is sketched in ¢gures 2 and 3. When group ¢tness rapidly saturates (high s, ¢gure 2), m * appears highly constrained by n, showing relatively little variation with either relatedness, passive ¢tness or the cost of manipulation. As group size increases, m * decreases at a rate su¤-cient to cause the summed degree of manipulative e¡ort (nm * ) to show a slight increase. Replace manipulation with vigilance, and ¢gure 2 re£ects the key empirical trends found in the vigilance behaviour of a range of social birds and mammals (see Roberts (1996) and references therein), highlighting a shared underlying logic of collective action.
Introducing a broader period of responsiveness to the G(n m) function (low s, ¢gure 3) leads to greater model diversity, depending on c, p and R. In ¢gure 3, s is de¢ned so that group ¢tness saturates for n of around 500, as opposed to n % 5 in ¢gure 2. A high saturation point reduces the return to manipulation in small group sizes.
When passive ¢tness is zero, manipulation in small groups is still stable, as it is the only way to secure any ¢tness. The resulting pattern of m * against group size is qualitatively similar to the pattern in ¢gure 2, with m * decreasing near inversely to group size. When passive ¢tness is non-zero, a trade-o¡ between individual ¢tness costs and group ¢tness bene¢ts is introduced. This tradeo¡ explains the zero m * region in ¢gure 3 at low group sizes. As group size increases, the potential for cooperatively achieving a signi¢cant manipulative bene¢t increases, until a threshold is reached (whose position is sensitive to p, R and c). Above the threshold, manipulation becomes a stable strategy, as group size is su¤ciently large to cooperatively generate su¤cient group ¢tness to outweigh a reduction in passive ¢tness.
For a given parameter set, the e¡ect of increasing R is, unsurprisingly, to increase m * . However, it is important to note that manipulation is stable under a range of parameter values in unrelated groups. The ¢tness pay-o¡s for R 1 illustrate pure group selection, i.e. they maximize W(m,m). When relatedness is imperfect, intragroup selection becomes increasingly important as n increases Figure 3. The e¡ects of (a) group size (n) and cost of manipulation on ESS manipulation, m * , and (b) resulting group behaviour at equilibrium, nm * , plotted from numerical solutions to equation (6). The cost of manipulation ranges in steps of 0.1 from c 0.1 (uppermost lines) to c 1 (lowermost lines). Mean pairwise relatedness, r, is 0.5. The`diminishing returns' group ¢tness function (see equation (5)) is de¢ned by a passive ¢tness, p, of 0.5 and a saturation rate, s, of 0.01.
(relatedness within the group, and genetic diversity between groups decreases with increasing n; see equation (4)). Pure intragroup selection would require every group to consist of the same proportion of competing strains, an unlikely situation. What we see in the models of imperfect relatedness is a tension between inter-and intragroup level selection. Take, for example, a case where n 20, c 0.1, p 0.5 and s 1 (illustrated for minimally related groupings in ¢gure 2). When R 1, m * equilibrates to the best group strategy, m * 0.23. However, if di¡erent genotypes were to exist within the same host, any with a lower m would have a higher ¢tness. The ¢tness of m 
(c) Sigmoidal group ¢tness
The`diminishing returns' group ¢tness function illustrated in ¢gure 1 and equation (5) is appealing when one considers the net outcome of host manipulation. Poulin (1994a) argued that investment in manipulation would show diminishing returns, using the following imaginary example. Consider a parasite that increases the proportion of time spent by its intermediate host away from a shelter, enhancing the probability of consumption by the de¢nitive host. The parasite would tend to bene¢t more if it increased time in the open from 0 to 10%, than if it increased it from 50 to 60%, as the bene¢t of a ¢xed extra exposure period would be lower if exposure was already high. This is plausible, but the perspective on manipulative outcome may be misleading, as the relationship between manipulative e¡ort and outcome is unlikely to be linear. Nonlinearities between manipulative e¡ort and outcome are likely to be particularly evident in chemically mediated manipulation, where lower response thresholds will make small manipulative e¡orts relatively unrewarding. An alternative group ¢tness function might therefore be sigmoidal. The following group ¢tness function gives a sigmoidal response to increasing summed manipulation, scaled between p and 1
Equation (6) is sketched in ¢gure 1. Substituting equation (6) into equation (1) we have
which by the method outlined in } 2(a) yields an expression capturing the ESS, m * :
A solution for m * was found numerically from equation (8), and is sketched in ¢gure 4. The distinctive pattern of the response is very conserved; parameter manipulation simply alters the position and spacing of the m * threshold points. Given a cost to manipulation of c, the threshold group size for cooperative manipulation rises with decreasing R and s, and with increasing p.
DISCUSSION
The most striking model prediction is the existence of a group size threshold, below which manipulation is zero. The predicted behaviour above the threshold (which may be zero; see ¢gure 2) depends critically on the biological details of the individual^group interaction (compare ¢gure 3 with ¢gure 4). The`diminishing returns' model predicts a gradual fade-in of group manipulative behaviour above the threshold point, whereas the`sigmoidal' model predicts an abrupt switch in group behaviour. The position of the threshold is the result of a compromise between relatedness (R) and group sensitivity (s) promoting a low threshold, and individual cost (c) and passive ¢tness (p) promoting a high threshold.
Despite an underlying generality, it remains crucial to tailor the model to speci¢c biological systems. The results of this study demonstrate the signi¢cant impact on (7)) is de¢ned by a passive ¢tness, p, of 0.5 and a saturation rate, s, of 1. predicted group behaviour of altering the form of the group ¢tness function. Many other signi¢cant variants of the group ¢tness function exist; for example, G(n m) may decline as n becomes large, due to parasite-induced host mortality and crowding e¡ects. Furthermore, an individual's ¢tness function may vary depending on location, both spatially and temporally in the hierarchy of parasite recruitment. To illustrate the importance of tailoring the models to speci¢c biological systems, I shall review a number of model assumptions and data limitations in the light of potential biological test-cases (unpublished results).
(a) Macroparasites and static group size
To make between-lineage predictions on the level of host manipulation, it is necessary to treat parasite infrapopulation size, n, as a characteristic of a particular parasite species or strain. This assumption underpins the idea that an optimal level of manipulation (m * ) characterizing a particular lineage evolves in response to a particular group size, n. Describing the infrapopulation size of a parasite species with a single static ¢gure n is a simpli¢ca-tion best suited to the relatively stable infrapopulation dynamics of macroparasites. Dynamic changes in cooperative behaviour within expanding infrapopulations are discussed in } 3(b).
The results of this study lead to two related epidemiological predictions (see ¢gures 2b^4b): (i) that summed host manipulation (nm * ) will be more extensive in parasite species characterized by greater mean burdens, and (ii) that the frequency of manipulation will be greater in higher-burden species. Predictions based on the other parameters (p, c, s and R) are easy to generate using the model, but would be extremely di¤cult to test due to a lack of data on p, c, s and to a lesser extent, R.
Despite a multitude of qualitative reports of host manipulation, quantitative estimates of the extent of host manipulation are available for no more than 30 species of macroparasite, scattered across two phyla (Poulin 1994b; Thomas et al. 1998) . Given the scarce and phylogenetically scattered data, the most productive approach would be to focus on a particular species of manipulative macroparasite, and compare manipulative behaviour between di¡ering strains or infection foci characterized by di¡ering infrapopulation sizes. A between-strain analysis would be far more robust to confounding variables (parasite size, life cycle, mechanism of manipulation, phylogeny, etc.), and so require a smaller sample size.
Further considerations must be taken into account in selecting suitable test systems, as a number of welldocumented cases of host manipulation occupy extremes of the model parameter space, lessening the power of the model to account for variation in manipulative behaviour. The parameter n is perhaps most likely to be observed at an extreme, as in several well-documented helminthî nvertebrate systems, infrapopulation sizes are commonly one (Poulin & Thomas (1999) and references therein), thus losing the cooperative element of manipulation central to the model. Unfortunately, little or no information exists on the costs of manipulation (Poulin 1994a ), yet it is conceivable that adaptive manipulation may in certain circumstances be costless, being, for example, a consequence of a costless shift in parasite niche within the host body. Were manipulation to be cost free, then the basic trade-o¡ between individual cost and group bene¢t would be lost.
The most productive test-cases for the model would involve groups of parasites contributing in a dosedependent (i.e. potentially costly) manner to a manipulative goal. Examples abound of chemically mediated manipulation, particularly in microparasite systems, as I shall discuss below. Among macroparasites, perhaps the most promising study cases involve parasites of humans, due to a relative abundance of data. S. P. Brown and B. T. Grenfell are currently working on a stochastic simulation model of manipulation of the human immune system by schistosome worms. Brie£y, adult worms within the de¢-nitive (e.g. human) host are thought to secrete an antigen that is cross-reactive with larval surface antigen (Smithers & Terry 1967 , 1969 , thus e¡ectively vaccinating the host against larval competitors. By using a tailored version of the basic model outlined in this paper, it is possible to generate epidemiological predictions linking schistosome prevalence at a particular infection focus with the intensity of immune system manipulation.
Comparative predictions about the manipulative behaviour of individual parasites (see ¢gures 2a^4a) o¡er a more direct test of the model, as adaptive variation in manipulative e¡ort between parasite strains would be tested by direct observation, rather than by inference from epidemiological trends. Before these predictions can be assessed properly, a quantitative understanding of the mechanisms of host manipulation is required.
(b) Microparasites and variable group size
In addition to di¡erences in manipulative e¡ort between lineages, the model can be applied to changes in manipulative behaviour within single, expanding, infrapopulations of parasites. Indeed, the most compelling qualitative support for the threshold phenomenon can be found in the pattern of host manipulation within expanding populations of bacteria.
Cooperative behaviour in bacterial populations is commonplace. Colonies modify their environment in many ways, for example by the release of enzymes, ¢brous building materials or antibacterial agents (Fuqua et al. 1996) . Erwinia carotovora, a plant tuber pathogen, provides a well-studied example of bacterial cooperation. Established colonies of E. carotovora produce a range of digestive enzymes and antibacterial agents ensuring e¤-cient digestion of the host in the absence of bacterial competitors (Bainton et al. 1992; Jones et al. 1993) . Intriguingly, individual bacterial cells only begin to secretè cooperative' enzymes once a distinct density threshold has been passed, in line with the main qualitative prediction of the model presented above.
In order to tailor phenotypic expression to changing group size, bacteria face the problem of assessing group size. Flocks of birds face the same problem when adjusting vigilance levels. Crested terns respond to £ock arrivals by decreasing vigilance, and to departures by increasing vigilance, illustrating a dynamic adjustment of strategy (Roberts 1995) . Quorum-sensing bacteria use chemical rather than visual cues to adjust their levels of cooperation. Through the release of low molecular weight signalling molecules, they are able to monitor and respond to changes in bacterial density (Fuqua et al. 1996;  Host manipulation S. P. Brown 1903 Robson et al. 1997) . Once a particular density threshold is crossed, cooperative behaviour (e.g. the production of tissue-degrading enzymes in E. carotovora) is switched on.
The additional strategic complexity of producing and responding to a signalling molecule adds an extra dimension to the system captured in the current models. At present, equations (8) and (6) describe an ESS of manipulative e¡ort for a quorum-sensing bacterium, under the assumptions of honest, costless, group size information. More realistically, signalling will have a cost, and it may not pay to signal honestly. S. P. Brown and R. A. Johnstone (unpublished results) explore the conditions for signal stability in a two-trait game-theoretic model of quorumsensing bacteria.
In conclusion, the models suggest that the extent of host manipulation is the result of a tension between intrahost selection favouring lower manipulative e¡ort and interhost selection favouring higher manipulative e¡ort. By linking the e¡ects of infrapopulation size, relatedness and costb ene¢t functions, plausible quantitative predictions are generated. Two contrasting applications are highlighted for further investigation, each requiring theoretical care in tailoring the model to speci¢c biological systems.
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